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BOARD OF EDUC. v. CEARFOSS

Perhaps the form of the decree is discretionary with the
Chancellor, not to be disturbed on appeal. Perhaps it is
best not to permit a defendant to be under a greater sanction for one part of the decree than for the other.
If this be so, then (if the Chancellor be willing to make
but a single order) a father can only get the benefit of the
Bushman case's exemption from contempt sentence when
the order for the support of the child is imposed in a mere
custody case, or, if in a divorce case, where the wife, either
for economic or conduct reasons, is entitled to no alimony
at all. So long as fathers who do not support their children
may be punished under the alternative criminal method,
and so long as husbands may be punished both by this
method and for contempt of court, any step which limits
the doctrine of the Bushman case is to be applauded.
TENURE AND REMEDIES UNDER SCHOOL
TEACHERS' CONTRACTS
Board of Education of Washington County v. Cearfoss.1
Plaintiff was employed on July 1, 1921 as a school
teacher by the defendant school board under a uniform
state-wide contract adopted by the State Board of Education in pursuance of power delegated to it by the legislature. 2 This contract provided that either party could
"terminate it at the end of the first or second school year
by giving thirty days notice in writing to the other during the month of June or July". Further provisions specified that the contract should continue from year to year
subject only to the right of the County Board to dismiss
the teacher for cause shown as governed by Art. 77 Sec.
86,8 in which case the teacher would have the right to appeal to the State Superintendent if the decision of the
County Board were not unanimous. The school board refused to reassign the teacher on June 30, 1930 without
cause being shown. In the first case a demurrer to the
declaration in the action to recover for breach was over1 168 Md. 34, 176 Ati. 48 (1934) ; same case on earlier appeal, 165 Md.
178, 166 AtI. 732 (1933). Although the cases involved three plaintiffs, the
case is considered as if only one were involved as the facts and holding
pertaining
to each are similar.
2
Md. Code, Art. 77, Sec. 11.
3 "Any county board of education may, on the recommendation of the
county superintendent, suspend any teacher . . . for immorality, dishonesty, intemperance, insubordination, incompetence, or wilful neglect of
duty . . ."
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ruled. This ruling was sustained on appeal, and the Court
affirmed the judgment for damages given by the trial
court.' The second and instant case concerns a subsequent suit by the same teacher on the same contract for
salary accruing from the date of the first judgment until
the date of reemployment under a new contract although
she had rendered no services during that period. By demurrer and special plea the defendant maintained that the
former judgment was a bar to any future action. The overruling of the demurrer and plea was sustained on appeal.
Held, There was no absolute power of recession vested in
the school authorities, and, as the dismissal was not accompanied by a given reason and was without an opportunity
to be heard, the continued refusal to appoint the teacher at
the beginning of each year constituted successive breaches.
The principal case raises a master-servant problem concerning (a) The remedies open to a servant wrongfully
discharged; (b) The amount of damages which may be recovered; (c) Defense of master based upon a prior adjudication on the same contract.
Maryland in line with the weight of authority, 5 definitely
established, in Keedy v. Long,6 two forms of remedies open
to a servant who has been wrongfully dismissed. These
remedies can be more easily understood in the light of the
facts of that case. The plaintiff was employed for a period of one year to teach music in a private institution.
Her services commenced on September 6 and continued until October 28. Her salary had been paid to October 6. A
few days after her discharge of October 28, she brought
suit before a justice of the peace to recover on a quantum merit for her salary for the period of twenty days.
A judgment for twenty days services was rendered and
satisfied. Some months thereafter she sued for breach of
the contract.
In denying further recovery, the court, in substance
set forth the following rules. There are only two remedies
open to a servant who has been wrongfully discharged. He
may treat the contract as rescinded and sue on a quantum
meruit for wages already due him, or he may treat the contract as a continuing one and sue for its breach. In the
first type he may recover only for wages actually due him
for services. In the second type, his recovery includes,
' 165 Md. 178, 166 Ad. 732 (1933).
534 C. J., p. 831.
6 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704, 5 L. &. A. 759 (1889).
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not only wages due, but also damages for the breach. If
the servant elects to sue on a quantum meruit, he treats the
contract as rescinded, and this will bar any subsequent action
for its breach, which would be founded on the idea of continuance. If he sues for the breach, he cannot subsequently sue
on a quantum meruit as this pre-supposes the total recession of the contract. Hence, it can readily be seen that
the two remedies open to a servant are inherently different in theory. The quantum meruit is based upon the idea
of recession; while the suit for breach is based upon the
idea of continuance of the contract. A judgment under
either of which will bar a subsequent action on the other.
The holding in the Keedy case was reaffirmed in Olinstead v. Bach7 where the plaintiff had been employed for
one year at a fifty dollar weekly wage. At a time when his
wages were paid in full, he was wrongfully dismissed. He
recovered fifty dollars before a justice of the peace. Subsequently, he instituted another suit maintaining that recovery was merely for one week's wages which had accrued
subsequent to his dismissal. The court held that as no
wages were due at the time of his discharge, the suit
before the justice of the peace could have proceeded
under only one theory-namely, that the contract had been
breached and suit was for damages therefor, and that that
suit was a bar to any subsequent suit.8
Since, as has been pointed out, when no wages are due
at the time of discharge and suit cannot therefore be
brought on a quantum meruit, the plaintiff is limited to
damages for the breach, the question arises as to the method of ascertaining these damages. This question must be
answered according to the time at which suit is brought.
Assuming that the action is brought immediately upon discharge, the damages as assessed for the entire term of
employment must, of necessity, be conjectural. In Hippodrome Company v. Lewis9 the court quoted Chamberlin v.
Morga 10 with approval. "In estimating the damages the
jury have the right to consider the wages which he would
have earned under the contract, the probability whether his
life and that of the defendant would continue to the end of
78 Md. 132, 27 Atl. 501, 44 A. L. R. 273, 18 L. R. A. 53, 22 L. R. A. 74
(1893).

8Cases of this kind must be distinguished from those wherein the services
are actually continued, and suit is brought at the end of each period when
wages are due for those wages which have actually been earned during that
period.
9 130 Md. 154. 100 Atl. 78 (1917).
10 68 Penn. St. 168 (1871).
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the contract period, whether the plaintiff's working ability
would continue to the end of the contract period, and any
of the uncertainties growing out of the terms of the contract, as well as the likelihood that the plaintiff would be
able to earn money in other work during the time. But
it is not the law that damages which may be larger or
smaller because of such uncertainties are not recoverable."
If, however, the plaintiff should choose to wait until the
term of employment has expired before bringing his suit,
he will be entitled to his wages for the entire term less any
amount he has earned or could have earned by the exercise of proper diligence in seeking similar employment."
Clearly, unless the principal case can be distinguished
from the Maryland cases considered above, the initial suit
and judgment would be a bar to the instant suit. Without
the aid of authority, however, the Court was able to make
a distinction. In view of the fact that the contract was,
unless terminated at the end of the second year, to continue
from year to year subject only to the statutory causes of
dismissal, the conclusion was reached that the refusal to
reassign the teacher did not sever the relationship of the
teacher to the school board, and the refusal at the beginning of each school year constituted a new breach for a
distinct period of duty for which breach an action would
lie. The Court in effect held that in the normal masterservant relationship, the master has the power to dismiss
and thus terminate the contract, even though he be without legal right to do so; whereas, in the case of public
school teachers employed under the uniform contract, the
employer lacks not only the legal right to discharge, but
is also without the power to do so unless such power is exercised in pursuance of the statute for cause shown. The
Court was able to reach this result by considering the terms
of the contract
in relationship to the teacher Retirement
System 12 which, taken together, showed an intent to establish a tenure relationship.
The soundness of the result, in the mind of this writer,
is not open to question. The Court undoubtedly carried
out the intent and policy established by and for the public school system of Maryland. In order to remove primary
and secondary education from the realm of politics and to
induce capable people to meet the legislative requirements
for teachers' certificates and enter upon a life-long teach" Supra

note 9, 130 Md. 157.
"' Md. Code, Art. 77, Secs. 93-103.
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ing career, the uniform contract was adopted. This offers
to those successfully completing two years teaching a tenure relationship with the promise of retirement. The decision of the Court tends to uphold this educational policy.
Any other result would, in effect, give the school board
the power to force a teacher out of the system. The choice
then open to the discharged teacher would be (1) to go
hungry for five or ten years without any pay, or (2) to
sue at once for breach of the entire contract and to recover
a judgment barring any further recovery, which would terminate his connection with the school system. The whole
theory of the statutes regarding teachers and the pension
system is opposed to this idea that the school board has
any such power. It should not have the power to force
such a choice on a teacher.

INTERPRETATION OF DISABILITY
INSURANCE POLICIES
New England Life Insurance Co. v. Hurst'
Insurer-appellant issued two policies of life insurance
to insured-appellee. Each policy contained a supplemental
agreement providing for payment of a monthly income and
a waiver of premiums should the insured become "totally
and permanently" disabled. Insured became addicted to
alcohol, and through constant excessive use acquired the
disease known as acute or chronic alcoholism (also known
as delerium tremens or D. T.'s). For approximately five
months he was unable to attend to his own affairs and
spent part of that time as an inmate of a sanitarium for
treatment of his condition. Some seven months after the
onset of his disabling disease, insured regained his health
and began at once to work for a brokerage house, receiving from such occupation a fairly remunerative salary. Insured then claimed the monthly income which had accrued
during his period of disability, and brought suit to recover
the same after insurer disallowed the claim. The trial
court found for the insured, and insurer appealed. Held:
Affirmed.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals discussed each of
three points raised in the case. The first and most important question concerned the meaning of the word "perma1199 At. 822 (Md. 1938).

